DSRV & Co. LLP · Chartered Accountants · Gurugram / Delhi NCR · Knowledge Series — Indirect Tax September 2026

Every GST demand begins with a show cause notice. For most businesses it is the first — and often the only — moment when the department must state, in writing, exactly what it alleges and why. In two decisions delivered six days apart in August 2026, the Supreme Court of India examined what a valid GST show cause notice must contain and when it must be issued. Both notices were struck down. This case study explains the two rulings in plain language, what they settle, what they leave open, and what a business holding a GST notice today should understand. It is an educational analysis of publicly reported judgments, not a comment on any client matter.

Why the show cause notice is the whole battle

Under the CGST Act, 2017, a demand for tax that has been short-paid or credit wrongly availed proceeds under one of two provisions. Section 73 is the ordinary route: the department must issue its final order within three years from the due date of the annual return for the relevant year, and the notice must go out at least three months before that deadline. Section 74 is the extended route for cases of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax: the order deadline stretches to five years and the penalty rises to one hundred per cent. The gap between the two routes — two extra years, and a tenfold penalty — explains the recurring pattern the Supreme Court confronted: notices issued after the threeyear period had expired, labelled as Section 74 notices, reciting the words 'fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression' without stating any facts to support them.

Case one: G.R. Infra Projects Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (19 August 2026)

The facts. A State GST authority issued a show cause notice dated 13 June 2025 for the financial year 2018-19, invoking Section 74. The investigation had a long history — summons, an inspection, statements recorded from the accountant, authorised signatory and a director, and a number of scheduled hearings that the taxpayer did not attend. A draft notice and a pre-notice intimation preceded the show cause notice. The Madhya Pradesh High Court declined to interfere; the taxpayer appealed to the Supreme Court.

The limitation question. The Court first worked out the Section 73 deadline. The due date for the annual return for 2018-19, after statutory extensions, was 31 December 2020. Three years from that date is 31 December 2023. The Court then applied its own orders passed during the pandemic, which directed that the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 be excluded from limitation under all statutes. The portion of that period falling within the three-year window was one year and two months, which had to be added on — taking the outer date to 28 February 2025. A notice issued on 13 June 2025 was therefore beyond the Section 73 period. The only way it could survive was as a valid Section 74 notice.

The fraud question. Here the Court was categorical. Reading the notice, it found nothing beyond a bland statement of 'fraud or concealment of facts' — no explanation of how fraud was inferred or how concealment was detected. The Court went further: the word 'or' showed that even the officer was unsure whether the case was one of fraud or of concealment. For the extended period to apply, the allegations leading to the inference of fraud or suppression must emanate from the notice itself; the words cannot be used mechanically. The State's lawyers asked the Court to read the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court, where the allegations had been elaborated. The Court refused, on what it called the trite principle that the requirements which make a notice valid must be found in the notice and cannot be supplied later by an affidavit in court. The notice and the High Court's order were set aside, and the State was directed not to take any further proceedings under the notice.

Case two: Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India (25 August 2026)

The facts. A Central GST authority issued a show cause notice — also dated 13 June 2025 — covering three financial years, 2018-19 to 2020-21, alleging mismatch of input tax credit and short payment of tax. The notice originated in an audit objection raised by the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The department had itself contested that objection before the Public Accounts Committee. After issuing the notice, it transferred the matter to the 'call book' (departmental parlance for keeping it in abeyance), then revived it two weeks later as a 'protective demand' because limitation was approaching, and eventually passed an order in December 2025. The Jharkhand High Court upheld the proceedings; the taxpayer appealed.

The limitation question. Applying the same method, the Court found that the outer date for all three years worked out to 28 February 2025 — for 2018-19 and 2019-20 after adding the pandemic exclusion, and for 2020-21 because the annual return due date itself was 28 February 2022 and three years ran from there. The department argued that its audit communications and document requests in 2024 meant the proceedings had been 'initiated' in time. The Court rejected this: the three-year limit under Section 73(10) governs the order, and Section 73(2) requires the notice at least three months before it; correspondence does not stop the clock. The department also relied on Explanation 2 to Section 74, which had defined 'suppression' to include mere non-declaration of facts. The Court declined to apply it, noting that the Explanation had been omitted from the statute with effect from 1 November 2024 and could not be invoked for a notice issued in June 2025.

The fraud question. The Court held that a Section 73 or 74 notice can issue only on the satisfaction of the assessing officer himself — an audit objection is not a substitute. For Section 74, the officer must be satisfied not merely that tax was short-paid but that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression caused it. The department's own decision to contest the audit objection before the Public Accounts Committee showed that no such satisfaction existed. And the notice, apart from a bland statement that credit was availed 'without documentary evidence and suppress the facts', contained no foundational facts. The Court's language is worth quoting in substance: the extended period is not intended as lip service to the provisions; the words are not to be mechanically recited to enable recovery outside the normal limitation. The notice and the December 2025 order were set aside. Because the five-year outer limit for these years had not yet expired, the Court granted the department liberty to initiate a fresh Section 74 proceeding — provided the foundational facts appear in the notice itself and the order is passed before 28 February 2027.

What the two rulings settle

First, a Section 74 notice must plead facts, not formulas. The Central Excise and Customs principle that suppression means a deliberate, positive act with intent to evade tax — not mere non-payment or a difference of interpretation — is now applied to GST by the Supreme Court directly. The facts from which fraud or suppression is inferred must appear in the notice.

Second, a notice is judged by its own contents. Whatever the department may explain later — in an affidavit, in the final order, or in argument — cannot cure what the notice omitted. This closes a door that departmental practice had leaned on heavily.

Third, the way the allegation is worded matters. A notice that alleges 'fraud or suppression' in the alternative signals that the officer has not made up his mind — and that itself is a defect.

Fourth, limitation is a hard boundary. The three-year period runs from the extended annual-return due date, is enlarged only by the pandemic exclusion falling within it, and is not stretched by audit letters, summons or document requests. A notice issued after the outer date cannot be rescued by relabelling it under Section 74 unless the fraud case is genuinely made out.

Fifth, officers must form their own satisfaction. Notices driven by audit paragraphs — a very large category — are valid only if the proper officer has independently concluded that tax was short-paid and, for the extended period, that fraud or suppression caused it. GST has no concept of a 'protective' demand or a 'call book'.

Sixth, for notices issued on or after 1 November 2024, the statutory extension of 'suppression' to mere non-declaration is no longer available. The common-law standard of wilful suppression governs.

What remains open

Two points deserve candour. The Supreme Court computed limitation using its own pandemic orders and did not refer to the Government's notifications under Section 168A that had extended the Section 73 deadlines for 2017-18 to 2019-20 — notifications whose validity is separately pending before the Supreme Court in another batch, and whose dates differ from those the Court arrived at here. How the two lines of reasoning fit together is a live question. And the consequences of a defective notice are not uniform: in G.R. Infra Projects the notice was quashed with a direction to desist, because both routes had closed; in Tata Steel, with the five-year window still open, the department was permitted to start afresh with a properly pleaded notice. A business whose notice is set aside on these grounds should therefore understand whether the extended period remains available in its own case.

Points a business with a pending GST notice should consider

Compute the limitation independently — from the extended annual-return due date, adding only the pandemic exclusion falling within the window — and compare it with the notice date. Read the notice for facts, not labels: identify what positive act of fraud or suppression, and what intent, it actually alleges, and where. Note whether the allegation is pleaded in the alternative. If the notice follows an audit objection, ask whether the officer's own satisfaction is recorded and what became of the objection. Check the date of the notice against 1 November 2024 for the Explanation 2 point. And raise every such objection in writing in the first reply — the Supreme Court has confirmed that these are questions about the validity of the notice itself, which is exactly where they must be taken.

About this publication. This case study is published by DSRV & Co. LLP, Chartered Accountants, Gurugram, as part of its knowledge series on indirect tax law, for the general information of readers. It analyses judgments of the Supreme Court of India that are matters of public record. It is not an advertisement, does not solicit professional work, and does not constitute legal or professional advice. Readers facing a specific notice should obtain advice on their own facts from a qualified professional of their choice.

Disclaimer: This publication is intended solely for general information and knowledge-sharing and is not an advertisement or solicitation of professional work within the meaning of the ICAI Council Guidelines on Advertisement for Members in Practice or Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India Rules. It does not constitute legal, tax or professional advice and does not create any professional relationship. The judgments discussed are reported decisions of the Supreme Court of India; statutory provisions and case status — including matters pending before the Supreme Court — should be verified as on the date of use. No claim is made as to outcomes in any matter.

Frequently asked questions

Can the GST department issue a notice for 2018-19 or 2019-20 today?

Under Section 73 (non-fraud), the Supreme Court has held that the outer date for issuing the order for these years, after the pandemic exclusion, was 28 February 2025; a notice after that date is time-barred under Section 73. Under Section 74 (fraud), the five-year window — 28 February 2027 on the Court's method — may still be open, but only for a notice that itself sets out the facts constituting fraud or suppression. The separate question of the Section 168A notifications remains pending.

My notice says 'fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression' but gives no details. Is it valid?

On the Supreme Court's reasoning in both cases, a notice that merely recites the statutory words without stating the facts from which fraud or suppression is inferred does not validly invoke Section 74. Whether the demand survives at all then depends on whether the Section 73 period was still open when the notice issued.

Can the department explain the fraud allegation later, in the final order or in court?

No. The Supreme Court refused to look at a counter-affidavit that elaborated the allegations, holding that the requirements which make a notice valid must be contained in the notice itself.

If my notice is quashed, can the department issue a new one?

It depends on whether the extended five-year period is still available. In Tata Steel the Court permitted a fresh, properly pleaded notice because that period had not expired; in G.R. Infra Projects it directed the State to desist because both periods had run out. The position must be assessed year by year.

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